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Abstract: The demand for safe and secure journeys over roads and highways has been growing at
a tremendous pace over recent decades. At the same time, the smart city paradigm has emerged
to improve citizens’ quality of life by developing the smart mobility concept. Vehicular Ad hoc
NETworks (VANETs) are widely recognized to be instrumental in realizing such concept, by enabling
appealing safety and infotainment services. Such networks come with their own set of challenges,
which range from managing high node mobility to securing data and user privacy. The Software
Defined Networking (SDN) paradigm has been identified as a suitable solution for dealing with the
dynamic network environment, the increased number of connected devices, and the heterogeneity
of applications. While some preliminary investigations have been already conducted to check the
applicability of the SDN paradigm to VANETs, and its presumed benefits for managing resources and
mobility, it is still unclear what impact SDN will have on security and privacy. Security is a relevant
issue in VANETs, because of the impact that threats can have on drivers’ behavior and quality of life.
This paper opens a discussion on the security threats that future SDN-enabled VANETs will have to
face, and investigates how SDN could be beneficial in building new countermeasures. The analysis is
conducted in real use cases (smart parking, smart grid of electric vehicles, platooning, and emergency
services), which are expected to be among the vehicular applications that will most benefit from
introducing an SDN architecture.
Keywords: smart cities; VANETs; Software Defined Networking; mobility; security; privacy
1. Introduction
The integration of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) into a strategic approach
to sustainability, citizen well-being, and economic development, has led to the concept of the smart
city [1]. In other words, a city becomes “smart” when it takes advantage of ICT solutions to make
better use of public resources, increase the quality of the services offered to its citizens, and reduce the
operational costs of the public administration. In recent years, many cities have been installing sensors
throughout the urban environment to capture data and use them to offer new services, such as smart
collection of trashcans, management of traffic lights, assistance in finding for parking spots, or public
transportation flow management, among many others. All of them, not only improve citizens’ life
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quality, but also bear operational saving and financial gains. For instance, smart parking solutions not
only reduce driving time and pollution, but also raise the city’s administrative income from parking
fees. In fact, by correlating the parking spot occupancy data with payment data, it is possible to
discover infringements and apply sanctions accordingly. Similarly, smart sensors can detect when the
trashcan should be emptied, consequently improving pick-up schedules and at the same time saving
the city administration money.
Nowadays, particular interest in smart cities is focused on smart mobility, which includes
enhancing traffic conditions, travel efficiency, vehicle safety, and drivers’/passengers’ comfort while
on the road. Citizens want to connect to the Internet everywhere on the road, subscribe to a
variety of services, and get real-time information about traffic and facilities (e.g., accident reports,
road congestion, available parking spots, nearest ATM, gas stations, etc.). These services are mainly
provided by vehicular applications which must be able to cope with the high mobility of the network
environment and consequently with the unreliable connectivity, both in Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and
Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communication. Road Side Units (RSUs) are usually located only at
a few critical intersection points with short radio communication ranges. Therefore, connectivity is
intermittent: it is often broken and subsequently re-established in a different location [2].
Consequently, communication networks must be designed using a totally new approach, devising
a new network paradigm that will be structured to minimize the impact of disconnections caused by
vehicle mobility and improve reliability of communication in Vehicular Ad hoc NETworks (VANETs),
fostering the development of smart mobility. The Software Defined Networking (SDN) paradigm [3] is
a suitable candidate, and it is expected to result in a change from the way in which vehicular networks
were classically operated. The first SDN architecture for VANETs was proposed by Ku et al. [4] in 2014
and later enhanced to add cloud and fog components [5,6].
Some aspects of the benefits offered by SDN to VANETs have been investigated in the
literature [7–10], but never analyzed with respect to the impact that this network paradigm may
have on security and privacy when applied in VANETs. In fact, security-related issues still represent a
fundamental concern that could hinder SDN growth and development to its full potential [11]. At the
same time, security is of prime importance in smart cities, where citizens will accept the adoption of
the new technologies and services only if their privacy is not threatened. Security is also critical in
VANETs because of the impact that attacks can have on people’s health and quality of life. Motivated
by all these elements, in the present work we analyze how an SDN architecture could introduce new
vulnerabilities in VANETs while also enabling novel security mechanisms to tackle well-known threats
in VANETs.
The core contribution of this paper can thus be summarized as follows:
• A detailed survey of studies conducted by the research community for enabling SDN in VANETs
is provided. While the applicability of SDN in vehicular networks has been discussed in several
works, such a comprehensive overview with in-depth technical explanations is unprecedented.
• The awareness of the impact that SDN could have on security when applying such a paradigm in
smart cities is raised for the first time.
• The introduction of a clear vision of the novel security countermeasures that SDN could build
against some traditional attacks in VANETs, is totally novel and unprecedented.
• Finally, the applicability of the study in four concrete use cases shows the feasibility of the
proposed solutions that are destined to be successfully implemented in future smart cities.
The present article is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of related works
that have proved the relevance of SDN for improving resource and mobility management in
VANETs. Section 3 describes four use cases (smart parking, smart grid of electric vehicles, platooning,
and emergency services) where the use of SDN may be beneficial, and where security threats may
have relevant consequences. Section 4 focuses on the security concerns: we first identify the classical
attacks in VANETs, and then the main security issues related to SDN. Section 5 describes how SDN
Sensors 2016, 16, 2077 3 of 24
could positively impact security in the considered use cases. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper,
summarizing main take-home messages.
2. SDN for Resource and Mobility Management
In this section, we first outline the main features of the SDN paradigm. Then, we analyze how this
programmable approach applied to networking can be useful in easing the management of VANETs
in future smart cities and providing Quality of Service (QoS) support for different types of service.
By providing and overview of the few solutions already suggested in the literature, we highlight the
advantages offered by SDN, which make it a good candidate for coping with smart city issues and
especially for meeting the requirements of vehicular applications.
2.1. SDN: An Overview
The Software Defined Networking [3] paradigm introduces a centralized and programmable
way of designing networks and was designed to overcome the drawbacks of traditional networks,
such as manual configuration and maintenance of every single device in the network, high latency
in path-recovery due to distributed approach, etc. SDN separates the data plane from the control
plane, enhancing the programmability of the network by external applications. In an SDN-based
network, the intelligence is centralized in a network controller, which determines how traffic flows
will be forwarded within the network; while network devices (switches, routers) simply forward
the packets, following the per-flow rules installed by the controller. By means of a Southbound
Interface (SBI) and a Northbound Interface (NBI), the control plane can interact with the data plane
and application plane respectively. By doing this, SDN simplifies network management. In detail,
it provides highly dynamic, flexible and automated reconfiguration of the network, more efficient use
of network resources, and makes troubleshooting [12] and debugging easier.
2.2. SDN in VANETs
Initially designed for wired networks, the SDN paradigm has also been widely recognized
as an attractive and promising approach to improving wireless and mobile networks [13].
These can benefit from different aspects of the flexibility, programmability and centralized control
offered by SDN, such as in wireless resource optimization (i.e., channel allocation, interference
avoidance), packet routing in multi-hop multi-path scenarios, and efficient mobility and network
heterogeneity management. Being just an approach, rather than a rigid architecture, it is feasible to
apply SDN in a different context from the one it was initially designed for. In VANETs, for example,
where the node mobility is high and the network topology changes frequently, the adoption of SDN is
quite challenging. Several SDN-based architectures for VANETs have been proposed since 2014 [4–6]:
all assume the presence of a central Road Side Unit Controller (RSUC) that can communicate with
elements in the data plane and instruct vehicles and RSUs about the forwarding rules to apply and
which resources to allocate for different traffic flows, related to distinct aspects (safety, efficiency,
comfort, etc.). Figure 1 shows the reference SDN-enabled architecture for VANETs considered in this
work. In a fully-centralized mode of operation, the architecture is prone to the well-known drawbacks
of traditional wired SDN, e.g., the presence of single points of failure, loss of connectivity between
RSUC and data plane, etc. Because of its increased reliability, a hybrid operating mode is preferable,
in which the control of the network is shared between the RSUC and the local SDN agents that are
installed in certain RSUs and vehicles. In this case, vehicles are equipped with two distinct interfaces
for control channel communication, and for data channel exchanges [6]. While IEEE 802.11p (building
on Wi-Fi) has been identified as the protocol for V2V and V2I communication in the data plane, the
most suitable technology (among 4G, LTE, Wi-Fi, etc.) for the Southbound communication between
the RSUC and the other elements in the network is still an open research question. The limited number
of reserved channels versus the large number of applications to support, demands efficient spectrum
management techniques. A SDN-enabled architecture can increase channel utilization, while keeping
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the collision probability low [7]. An initial contribution in this area is provided by Liu et al. [8],
who have designed a cooperative data dissemination scheme for VANETs. An SDN agent, installed
in the RSU, can deliver scheduling decisions to the vehicles in its coverage range, instructing them
about which channel to tune to, and what data to transmit/receive. Moreover, a RSUC can estimate
the frequency and duration of contacts between vehicles and RSUs, and thus the amount of data that
they can exchange [9].
RSU2
Spectrum 
Management
Security 
Enhancement
Platooning 
Coordination ...
RSUiRSU1 RSUn
Applications
R S U C Control Plane
Data Plane
QoS 
Support
NBI
SBI
Figure 1. Reference SDN-enabled architecture. The RSU Controller (RSUC) converts the instructions
received by the applications into rules that are executed by RSUs and vehicles.
An SDN-enabled VANET has the advantage of dynamically adapting to topology changes by
reconfiguring data forwarding rules in the network [5]. In this way, SDN minimizes service latency
and improves user experience, while meeting the frequent and variable service demands of citizens
and drivers. For instance, if a vehicle A is out of the coverage range of the RSU, but can get the content
service from another neighbor vehicle B, which is currently within the RSU coverage range, the RSUC
could allocate more resources to vehicle B to allow content delivery to vehicle A in an Information
Centric Networking (ICN) fashion [14]. Similarly, an SDN controller can manage the number of data
flows per RSU, making sure each flow is served according to the expected QoS [10].
Most of the infotainment applications in future VANETs will require the exchange large
multimedia files. SDN has the potential to improve the management of content delivery [15] and in
particular of content caching and forwarding [14,16]. Obviously, caching drastically reduces the delay
for content discovery, retrieval and delivery in VANETs by providing multiple sources for the content.
For instance, Soua et al. [14] propose using the RSUC and taking advantage of its global view of the
network to identify the most popular content, according to a threshold, and the influential vehicles in
which to cache such content. Alternatively, a push-and-pull approach for delivering content, based on
content type, and on the number of users interested in it, namely Type-Based Content Distribution
(TBCD), is proposed by Cao et al. [16].
SDN can also improve and reduce the number of broadcast messages exchanged in VANETs,
with the consequent advantage of efficiently using network resources through collision reduction.
Liu et al. use this capability in defining an SDN architecture for GeoBroadcast in VANETs [17].
Normally, every periodic warning message received by nearest RSU from the source vehicle is routed
to the control center in the ITS (Intelligent Transport System), where it is redirected to every other RSU
located in the geographical area for broadcasting. This produces a considerable overhead, and thus
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a waste of bandwidth. In [17], the first warning message received by the source RSU is sent to the
SDN controller, which sets up the paths to the destination RSUs, and installs flow entries on RSUs
and intermediates nodes. These paths will be followed by all the other periodic warning messages to
broadcast. Therefore, controller overhead, message latency, and network bandwidth consumption are
all reduced at the same time. Such a scheme can improve performance in many scenarios, both static
(e.g., car accident) and dynamic (e.g., clear the way for an ambulance).
As highlighted in this section, the SDN paradigm can introduce several advantages when applied
to VANETs, but we are still far from a seamless integration of SDN in the vehicular environment due
to many challenges to be faced, most of them inherited from its mobile nature.
3. Use Cases in Future SDN-Based VANETs
Smart cities enhance the performance of urban services through tight integration of several sectors
using ICT. Each sector can have its own requirements for internal and external communication over the
network. Modern networks allow multiple tenants to share an infrastructure and offer the capability
of allocating resources to each tenant according to communication requirements. However, these
requirements can change in real time, depending on events occurring in the city; thus it may be
necessary to dynamically scale the amount of network resources allocated to tenants. This section
presents several use cases are presented, where SDN can be instrumental in managing the network
infrastructure to meet the requirements of the applications.
3.1. Smart Parking
One of the most well-known smart city applications is the smart parking system, already available
in several real deployments [18,19]. The main communicating infrastructure includes sensors for
parking and traffic detection, embedded into the ground. The sensor nodes communicate parking
space availability to a central server. A centralized control system stores and processes all the data
gathered from sensors, and the resulting information and services are usually offered to citizens by
means of mobile applications and city panels. The communication infrastructure design started in
the early days with multi-hop mesh network technologies but failed to cover wide areas due to the
complexity and the cost of the deployment of relays using city facilities and infrastructure such as
lampposts or traffic lights [20]. Most of the current systems use Low Power Wide Area Network
technologies such as these developed by Sigfox (Labège, France), Ingenu (San Diego, CA, USA),
Weightless (Cambridge, UK), and LoRa (San Ramon, CA, USA) [21]. This communication model
facilitates integration with cloud applications, as the messages are delivered at the transport layer
by the service provider. The smart parking service enables advanced parking management in cities
and facilitates the development of new applications, such as on-street parking reservation, effective
management of loading and unloading areas, and prioritization of drivers with reduced mobility or
disabilities. It also enables access to restricted areas without human intervention.
The addition of an SDN controller to the infrastructure can aid the dissemination of parking
availability in a given area through V2I/V2V communications or using communications between peers,
as achieved with the Floating Content approach [14,22–24]. Floating Content (FC) is an opportunistic
communication strategy that allows messages to be disseminated in a determined geographical area in
a distributed fashion. The aim of this approach is to control the probabilistic nature of the dissemination
by providing models that ensure a desired level of content diffusion. By using P2P communications,
the system experiences a reduction of inquiries sent to the central server and the need for information
panels, thus cutting costs for the central administration. In detail, the envisaged network architecture
includes an SDN controller co-located within an advanced LoRA gateway, which is a RSU equipped
with multiple interfaces that allow communication via different V2X technologies (IEEE 802.11p,
or LTE). When, for instance, a parking area is fully occupied, the controller can instruct the RSUs
in its coverage range to broadcast this information. The installation of the forwarding rules can
use cellular communication, while the data flow can be conveyed with IEEE 802.11p WAVE Short
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Messages (WSMs). To convey the information to vehicles that are currently distant, but which are
approaching the parking area, the SDN controller can also activate an Anchor Zone (AZ), as defined in
the Floating Content (FC) paradigm, and vehicles will subsequently exchange the data via wireless
V2V communication.
Smart parking is prone to several security threats, and in particular to hardware attacks,
which can compromise the physical devices (e.g., through radiated and magnetic interference) or
their communication interfaces (through jammers). The addition of an SDN controller in the parking
system can be particularly beneficial in detecting such attacks. Usually, monitoring applications can
be characterized [19] and hence any behavioral change in the data traffic flows may be used to detect
security threats. In particular, the SDN controller could perform anomaly detection based on traffic
analysis (e.g., on packet headers, or packet size, and other statistics). Smart parking raises several
issues concerning the privacy and confidentiality of citizens. Obviously, the guidance of citizens
to a free parking slot relies on sharing their position information, which will be stored in a large
central database managed by authorities. If a malicious actor compromises this database, confidential
information about drivers and passengers may be exposed. Furthermore, in some cities, access to some
parking spaces is reserved for residents of specific neighborhoods or for people with disabilities [25].
An attacker could redirect ineligible vehicles to these special parking spaces, causing disruption in
the city. Again, in this case, the detection of unexpected trends in data traffic flow, can allow the SDN
controller to identify potential attacks.
3.2. Smart Grid of Electric Vehicles
One of the main goals of smart cities is to improve energy efficiency and reduce greenhouse gases
emissions, to delay the climate change (also called climate departure in [26]) that is predicted to take place
in a few years. Beyond well-known services such as efficient street lighting and efficient scheduling
of traffic lights, another step in this direction would be to encourage the introduction of Electric
Vehicles (EVs). Although many researcher have been, and are being applied to investigate electrical
power applications in the public transportation sector [27–29], the key to consistently reducing vehicle
emissions is to apply it to vehicles in the private market. One of the main obstacles to this is the
tremendous impact the change would have on both the electricity and transportation sectors. However,
the beneficial effects are clear, and not just from the point of view of the environment [30].
EVs are considered to be the future active elements of smart grids, the technology that integrates
information and power networks to efficiently distribute electrical energy. The original smart grid
concept was devised to manage the distributed and intermittent production of electrical energy from
renewable sources. In such a scheme, EVs will be able to dynamically improve the storage capacity of
the power network in two ways: by absorbing unexpected generation peaks from renewable sources,
and by injecting electricity back to the grid, acting as a short-term or emergency power supply [31].
EVs will be the mobile portion of the smart grid, which will be connected to the power supply network
(static portion of the smart grid) through fixed-location facilities known as Electrical Vehicle Supply
Equipment (EVSE). The combination of EVs and EVSEs is defined as Electric Vehicle Infrastructure
(EVI), in which communications can take place via several technologies such as ZigBee (based on
IEEE 802.15.4), Wi-Fi (IEEE 802.11), Power Line Communications (PLC) and others [32]. When an EV
is connected to a EVSE, the two exchange information, as well as power, through the power cable.
In particular, the IEC 61851 standard [33] describes a communication and signaling protocol between
EV and EVSE, to exchange information about the State of Charge (SoC), electricity price, distance to
the next EVSEs and so on. It is very likely that, in the near future, such channels will be used more
intensively and extensively, carrying new types of messages like the electricity trading bids and other
information used by the smart grid applications [32]. Additionally, in some specific applications such
as the exchange of information about the location of charging stations on a road, EVs rely on V2V
communications enabled by the IEEE 802.11p standard [34].
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Increasing the freedom for communication across the EVI increases the number of possible
security threats that can arise, for example, malware can be carried by compromised vehicles and
infect EVSEs, which in turn will infect more EVs. This can obviously not only have a negative impact
on service availability and security, but also on secondary aspects like the robustness of the market
system, in which users might unduly benefit from services without paying (free-riding). On the EV side
of EVI, malicious software can bring about minor issues, like the incorrect display of indicators such
as fuel gauge and tachometer, up to more serious malfunctions in the safety system, such as taking
control of the vehicle throttle and brakes. Furthermore, since EVs take part in V2V communications,
the smart grid of EVs inherits the security vulnerabilities of VANETs. The combination of EVI with
smart grids is intrinsically complex and prone to security issues at several levels as discussed in
Section 5.2. The application of the SDN paradigm in EVI can be beneficial in addressing these issues:
an SDN controller can provide reliable, robust and secure power system monitoring, and can suggest a
smart charging schedule to EVs under given energy constraints. It can also enable security mechanisms
such as isolating malicious or infected EVs and EVSEs, so hindering them from accessing EVI services.
Figure 2 illustrates the SDN-based architecture that we propose for smart grids of EVs, where EVs
and EVSEs represent the mobile and fixed elements respectively of the data plane. Since the smart grid
is a wired network, we can imagine the OpenFlow protocol (with some adjustments) remaining the
standard for the SBI communication used by the controller for collecting statistics (e.g., SoC, amount
of energy remaining at EVSEs), and for imposing forwarding rules (i.e., the next EVSE at which to
charge). Every time that an EV connects to an EVSE, a signaling message is sent back to the controller,
which can keep track of the current topology and status of the network (e.g., level of charge of EVs).
With the support of several applications, the controller can not only install forwarding rules, but also
detect potential attacks implied by anomalous behaviors of data plane elements.
Controller
…… ...Charging	Schedule
Identity
Manager Monitoring
NBI
SBI
PKT_IN	(ev_connected)
$$
PKT_STATS_REQ
EVSEEVSE
EVSE
EVSE
EVSE
EVSE
Key: Signaling Messages	(OpenFlow)
Electrical	Power	Network
Figure 2. Generic architecture of an SDN-enabled EVI.
3.3. Platooning
With the dramatic increase of drivers using roads and highways every day at peak times to reach
their destination, there is an urgent need to control this large number of vehicles to ensure traffic fluidity
and reduce air pollution. Moreover, safe driving on crowded highways requires attentive drivers,
an accurate perception of the environment and critical decision making to react properly in emergency
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situations. These issues need to be tackled to provide smart mobility in smart cities. Platooning is one
promising solution for addressing these problems [35]. Here, platooning means the ability to drive
vehicles in controlled close formations called “platoons” at relatively small inter-vehicular distances.
Vehicles behind the first in this formation are called followers, and receive downstream information
from other vehicles in the platoon, as well as from a supervised vehicle known as the leading vehicle to
adjust the distance between them and maintain the stability of the platoon [35]. Commonly, a platoon
involves group of vehicles with common interests that benefit from having a trained, professional
driver who has additional training for leading a platoon. Hence, platooning promises not only to
provide smart mobility by also to enhance driving safety by reducing human involvement in the
driving process. Indeed, a typical application of platooning is Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control
(CACC). In the classical Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC), vehicles rely exclusively on radar technology
to sense an immediate (preceding or following) vehicle’s position and speed. This limited observation
cannot efficiently handle inter-vehicle distance, resulting in poor highway capacities in the smart city.
In contrast, CACC envisions that vehicles also receive information from the platoon leader via V2V
communications. The purpose is to better optimize the inter-vehicular distance [35]. In particular,
vehicles inside the platoon exchange periodic single-hop beacons (see Figure 3).
RSUC
WSMP 
header
Sender 
address
Receiver 
address
Position Max
deceleration
Acceleration Lane Id
Signaling message 
Data message (beacons, WSA)
Figure 3. SDN-enabled platooning.
The leader vehicle plays a major role in platoon path planning, intra-platoon synchronization
and collision avoidance. Thus, it is crucial to select the most appropriate entity to be the leader or to
take control of the leader. One trivial solution is to have a human driver who orchestrates the platoon.
However, this human leader is a part of a chain that is larger than the leading vehicle. This chain
includes humans, vehicles and environment (roads, infrastructure, traffic signals, etc.). Consequently,
this chain requires a central entity to manage the selection of an appropriate platoon leader and to
establish its action profile, such as its acceleration and deceleration pattern, according to the city
conditions. Since a smart city consists of complex transportation systems that are tightly connected,
a central entity, namely the RSUC, might have coarse-grained control over multiple platoons and
support each platoon leader, be responsible for intra-platoon issues, and wisely instruct follower
vehicles [36].
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In other words, the central controller can instruct the elements in the data plane (i.e., the platoon
leader and follower vehicles) with appropriate rules for acceleration/deceleration, merging/splitting
and changing lane according to real-time traffic conditions and unexpected events in the smart
city. For instance, by using signaling messages exchanged over cellular (LTE) or wireless links
(Wi-Fi or IEEE 802.11p), the RSUC can collect information on platoon status and abnormal vehicle
behavior. On the dissemination side, the RSUC can instruct the leader on how to set specific parameters
(acceleration, communication channels for data flow, scheduling policy of data messages, etc.) to ensure
better network utilization and a safer journey. Such data messages convey information about distance
and speed, for example, and are transmitted over IEEE 802.11p as beacon messages and WAVE Service
Advertisement (WSA). The centralized orchestration provided by the RSUC allows the traveling
distance over which the platoon stays intact to be maximized and therefore allows its lifetime to be
extended. In addition, the presence of a centralized controller plays a major role in keeping the platoon
secure and robust against cyber-attacks. For instance, the RSUC can support the platoon leader in
a fast and efficient manner in detecting jamming and replay attacks as well as attacks targeting the
management protocol. This latter is responsible for the splitting, merging, leaving and lane changing
maneuvers. These threats are investigated in depth in Section 5.3.
3.4. Emergency Services
In large cities, the management of emergency situations that require the mobilization of the
emergency services (e.g., firemen, medical services, police) becomes a difficult task when combined
with traffic management systems. A quick reaction in such circumstances improves emergency
management effectiveness and reduces its impact to the normal operation of the vehicular and
transportation infrastructure. For example, emergency events occurring in the transport system
may request the communication network to allocate additional communication channels or generally
an increased amount of resources, in order to manage the event efficiently. A tight coordination of data
network, traffic management systems and emergency services requires an adaptation of network data
flows to raise the priority of actions that will affect the immediate handling of the emergency, such as
quick traffic light actuation, deviation of traffic flows, and reservation of parking spots. More generally,
the communication requirements between Emergency Services and traffic management systems in
smart cities can range from best-effort to real-time depending on the type of information being
exchanged and the urgency of the communication. Rather than statically over-provisioning resources
to satisfy the possible needs of different types of communication, the SDN paradigm allows the flow of
information between actors to be dynamically controlled in a proactive or reactive manner. This offers
the ability to proactively provide a minimum amount of resources to these services and reactively scale
according to changes in application needs.
SDN can help to disseminate emergency messages about an event that has occurred in the
network by orchestrating Floating Content replication [14,22,23]. When an accident occurs, the vehicles
involved, as well as witness vehicles, can start to disseminate information about the event using
opportunistic communication. Specifically, the first vehicle that detects the anomaly (the seeder)
creates an Anchor Zone (AZ) representing the geographical area where vehicles interested in the
content are located [23,37]. When a vehicle in the AZ meets another vehicle that has a copy of the
message, it receives it via V2V communication and stores it until it exits the AZ. In this context,
the SDN controller can help the seeder vehicle to determine the best AZ parameters (shape, size)
to optimize dissemination, according to global mobility parameters that are estimated regularly by
the infrastructure.
If the accident requires prompt action from the rescue service, for example when peoples’ lives
are threatened, the SDN controller can rely on the infrastructure and ask RSUs to contact the first aid
service via cellular networks, announce the event to surrounding vehicles, and broadcast IEEE 802.11p
messages on the service channel as summarized in Figure 4.
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RSU
Data Messages (802.11p WSM)
Signaling Messages (OpenFlow)
Key:
AZnc
AZc
a. Non-critical accident b. Critical accident
R
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C
Rescue Team
Figure 4. Emergency scenarios: (a) Non-critical accident: the vehicles start an AZ to disseminate
local information about the moderate issue and optionally can send a Wave Short Message (WSM)
notification to the RSU; (b) Critical accident: the vehicles involved create an AZ with a bigger radius
than the non-critical case and notify the RSU about the entity of the accident, plus their location. In turn,
the RSU sends OpenFlow messages to the RSUC to signal the need for more network resources, and
waits for request approval or denial. At the same time, the RSU calculates the number of vehicles
involved and sends an aggregated WSM request to the rescue service, which answers with the estimated
arrival time that, in turn, will be forwarded to the vehicles concerned.
The synergy between the centralized (infrastructure-based) and the distributed (FC-based)
solutions can provide a quick local traffic redirection and a fast notification of the critical accident to
the emergency vehicle, which will benefit of clear roads in the neighborhood of the event.
Furthermore, SDN can also help to mitigate some typical security breaches in the Emergency
Service scenario, such as the Sink Hole Attack and the DDoS attack, by enforcing a trust scheme,
as described in detail in Section 5.4.
4. Security of SDN and VANETs
The awareness that smart cities are exposed to several cybersecurity challenges is
rapidly increasing, as shown by the creation of the global Securing Smart Cities initiative
(http://securingsmartcities.org/), which aims to find workable solutions to make our cities cyber-safe.
Security is of foremost importance in smart cities since business opportunities are strongly dependent
on regulation concerning privacy and trust in the technology. To increase market demand for new
emerging applications, citizens should be confident that data exchanges are secure, private, and that
their personal information is kept confidential. In this section, we first review the classical security and
privacy issues in VANETs. Then, in order to estimate the security threats that SDN could introduce
when applied in the vehicular domain, we study the vulnerabilities of SDN from a security perspective.
4.1. Security Threats in VANETs
The consequences of a security breach can be critical or dangerous for drivers and passengers.
Vehicular applications rely heavily on the messages exchanged, which impact drivers’ behavior.
By substituting a message, or sending fake data, a malicious user can threaten security in several
ways, for instance by generating traffic jams or, even worse, making the whole VANET unavailable
(i.e., Denial of Service, DoS, attack), which can be dangerous if an emergency situation occurs.
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Thus, each vehicle should be able to establish the reliability of the received message, based for
example, on the reputation of the sender vehicle.
To be cyber-safe, VANETs should meet the classical security requirements: Authenticity,
Availability, Confidentiality, Data Integrity, and Non-Repudiation. The large scale of the network,
the high mobility of the nodes, the uncertainty of their relative geographic positions, the intermittent
connectivity between the nodes, and the unreliable channel conditions, make it difficult to satisfy
these requisites [38]. There are several varieties of possible attacks for breaking security in VANETs.
A generic classification of attacks is proposed in [39], categorizing them as: Bogus Information,
DoS, Impersonation, Eavesdropping, Message Suspension, and Hardware Tampering. The literature
classifies attacks mainly according to the specific requirement they compromise [40,41], or the layer
of the protocol stack they impact [42]. For example, message tampering/suppression impacts data
integrity, and if data is manipulated with the intention of erasing action traces and hampering driver
identification, then it also impacts non-repudiation. From the protocol layer perspective, eavesdropping
and jamming are attacks on the physical layer, while traffic analysis operates at the application layer,
extracting private information from the data exchanged between vehicles (e.g., vehicle ID, location,
etc.). Table 1, at the end of this section, summarizes some of the main attacks in VANETs.
Authentication represents the first step towards securing VANETs: all RSUs and vehicles in the
network should register and get certificates from a Trusted Authority (TA). Before sending a message,
each vehicle should first digitally sign the message. By checking the signature, the receiver can
verify the integrity of the message, as well the identity of the sender. Despite these advantages,
authentication poses a privacy risk, given that the TA will be aware at any time of each user’s specific
location. An analysis of the security techniques that can secure VANETs while preserving privacy is
presented in [39]. Several anonymous authentication schemes have been proposed to cope with this
issue, and they can be grouped into three categories: group-signature-based schemes, pseudonymous
authentication schemes, and hybrid schemes. In brief, to hide the vehicle identity, and avoid it being
traced, the schemes use group signatures and pseudonymous authentication. While these increase the
level of privacy, they may impact availability and safety, due to the high computational effort needed
to verify the signature [41]. Trust schemes may be a solution to alleviate the costs and downsides of
authentication, while providing a means of verifying sender reliability and data integrity.
Despite the numerous and different methods proposed so far in the literature, VANETs cannot yet
be considered cyber-safe, and there is still a need to design new approaches that can preserve user
privacy, while protecting VANETs from attacks.
Table 1. Non-exhaustive list of attacks in VANETs, classified by affected TCP/IP Layer, from 1 (PHY)
to 5 (APP), and threatened Security Requirement (Security Req.): Authenticity (A), Availability (B),
Confidentiality (C), Data Integrity (D), and Non-Repudiation (E).
Attack Description Security Req. Affected LayerA B C D E 1 2 3 4 5
Brute Force
The attacker tries all the possible key combinations to access a
restricted entity or decrypt a piece of information X X X
GPS Spoofing
The attacker broadcasts a forged GPS signal that overtops the
legitimate one, so that vehicles get wrong position data X X X
Illusion Attack
The attacker spreads incorrect information on road conditions,
influencing the route of nearby vehicles X X X
Bogus Information Attack
Like Illusion Attacks, but here the attacker sends fictitious
messages about road conditions for its personal benefit X X X
DoS Attack
A huge amount of useless traffic is sent to the victim, to hamper
its responsiveness to legitimate user requests X X X X
DDos Attack
As DoS, but the attacker controls a set of so-called zombie nodes
that perform the attack in a distributed fashion X X X X
Sensors 2016, 16, 2077 12 of 24
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Attack Description Security Req. Affected LayerA B C D E 1 2 3 4 5
Jamming
A strong interference signal spoils the wireless traffic, so that no
communication can happen on a specific channel X X X
Malware Attack
An attacker inject the VANET with a malicious piece of software
that replicates itself via V2V communications X X X X
Masquerade Attack
The attacker steals the trusted identity of a reputable node and
sends (possibly modified) messages on its behalf X X X X X X
Replay Attack
The attacker sniffs a message that it reuses as is, for authenticated
access to a restricted network realm X X X
Repudiation
The attacker denies being the sender of a message, causing
retransmissions and therefore congestion X X X
Sink Hole Attack
The attacker vehicle instructs a VANET portion to route all traffic
to it, acting like a malicious gateway X X X X X X
Snooping
The attacker eavesdrops the network traffic at a certain layer
without modifying it, in order to extract information X X X X X X
Man-in-the-Middle
Adds to the Snooping Attack the possibility of altering the
message content and sending it to the original recipient X X X X X X X X X
Spamming
Many messages are sent through the VANET to vehicles that are
not interested in their content, typically ads X X
Sybil Attack
The attacker creates multiple fictitious identities to gain reputation
and power in a trust management scheme X X
Timing Attack
The reliability of the infrastructure is compromised by delaying
the forwarding of time-critical messages X X X
4.2. Security Threats in SDN
The adaptation of SDN in smart cities will offer authorities the opportunity to run and upgrade
different applications in a scalable manner, as they appear, without being concerned about network and
hardware complexity. Despite the foreseen tangible benefits of SDN in improving resource allocation
and network management (described in Section 2), SDN comes with its own vulnerabilities, inherited
from its architecture, and main features: Centralized Controller, Abstraction and Programmability,
and Flow-Based Forwarding.
Firstly, the controller represents a single point of failure, and the primary object of attack for
malicious users. Among the different possible attacks, a typical one is controller identity spoofing:
a malicious user plays the role of a fake controller, with the goal of manipulating the network [43].
This may have life-threatening consequences. For instance, a compromised SDN controller in a VANET
can redirect drivers to hazardous areas or toward busy highways, which may result in acute traffic
congestion and a dramatic increase in road casualties. Therefore, the SDN controller should be protected
from DoS attacks and vulnerable open ports and protocols [43]. In real deployments, multiple
controllers are implemented, each having its own security level. In this case, lack of orchestration
between controllers could increase their vulnerability. Indeed, an attacker will select the less secure
controllers to compromise flow tables [44]. The easy programmability of the network offered by
SDN, coupled with the abstraction of flows and underlying resources, magnifies the vulnerability of
SDN-bases systems to security breaches, malicious access and use. In fact, malicious software can be
easily used to reprogram the entire network to exploit it for a harmful purpose. In VANETs, this kind
of vulnerability allows the attacker to disseminate critical information without encryption instead of
sending it encrypted. This forged behavior may undo the efforts made by authorities to efficiently
disseminate critical information.
Finally, flow based-forwarding, the third key component of SDN, can also be a source of attacks.
Similar to route-poisoning attacks, misbehaving nodes can inject bogus flows to saturate forwarding
devices [45]. Since data plane nodes do not have sufficient intelligence, malicious flows cannot be
detected. Subsequently, by sending faked flows, an attacker can exhaust the memory and cache
of routers and switches, resulting in network dysfunction. For instance, in emergency situations,
injecting malicious flows in the VANET will degrade the ability of vehicles to forward packets, since
their memories are saturated. Consequently, safety messages will not be relayed to traffic authorities,
possibly leading to fatal accidents.
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However, by analyzing SDN’s main features from a different perspective, it can be revealed as
beneficial and useful in implementing novel security mechanisms, which can be successful where
other traditional mechanisms failed. In smart cities, citizens will be connected using a diverse set of
technologies such as LTE, GPRS, UMTS, ZigBee, Bluetooth and GSM. Each independently implements
a specific security policy without coordination. This can lead to potential policy conflict. For instance,
backhaul protection in LTE networks uses IPSec, while in VANETs Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
is used to prevent malicious users from jeopardizing the network. Handling these myriad security
mechanisms in a cooperative manner is not trivial. Here, the role of the controller is vital: with its
global view of the network, it is able to deploy a huge set of security policies while avoiding
overlap and conflict between them, and optimizing network resources. The global awareness of
the controller drastically reduces the complexity of security policy deployment and optimizes overall
network performance.
SDN’s abstraction from the underlying hardware resources can also be helpful in improving
security. In fact, diverse security mechanisms, such as multi-access technologies, wire sniffers,
firewalls, etc. [45], can be deployed without the burden of hardware complexity and compatibility.
In SDN based systems, forwarding devices are simple and do not process security standards:
these devices only accept instructions from the central controller. Hence, security administrators
can programmatically configure/upgrade/remove security policies in these unintelligent devices
according to the observed improper behavior without having to hand-code policies for many diverse
devices scattered over the smart city.
Finally, SDN allows per-flow-based granular security management to be implemented. In SDN,
all packets belonging to same flow are handled by the same service policy at the data layer. Therefore,
if some flows are identified as suspicious, it is possible to efficiently label and isolate them; forwarding
devices will not be burdened with handling packets coming from these labeled flows. Table 2
summarizes the security threats and opportunities offered by SDN, described in this section.
Table 2. SDN: Security vulnerabilities and opportunities.
SDN Features
Security
Advantages Threats
Centralized Controller Avoid conflicts among security policies Single point of failure
Abstraction and Programmability Support for diverse security policies Open to software vulnerabilities
Flow-based Forwarding Isolate and label suspicious flows Flow-poisoning attack
5. Improving VANETs Security Using SDN Paradigm
This section focuses on security benefits introduced by the application of SDN in VANETs.
For each use case we describe in detail how SDN, with its programmability and monitoring features,
can help in building new countermeasures against classical attacks in vehicular networks.
5.1. Smart Parking
Smart parking relies on the communication between intelligent sensors, deployed at each parking
spot, and the gateway, using wireless technologies such as Zigbee, LoRa and Wi-Fi. These networks
expose a large number of vulnerabilities and are subject to a wide range of attacks. We detail
two types of attacks: jamming and eavesdropping, which target service availability and data
confidentiality/privacy respectively.
Given the broadcast nature of wireless communication, an outsider attacker can jam the network
by using a transmitter more powerful than those embedded in sensors, as shown in Figure 5. This attack
hinders the reception of sensed data by the WSN gateway, preventing information about parking
spot availability from being transmitted to the RSU. Thus, the RSUC is not able to guide or schedule
vehicles in the neighborhood currently asking for parking spots. The intelligence and the dynamic
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programmability of SDN can solve the problem of service disruption due to transmission jamming:
the RSU gathers detailed information about the quality of channels used in the smart parking area
and the report is then forwarded to the RSUC via specific signaling messages (jamming_detected).
The RSUC builds a list of bad channels and asks the RSU to forward this list to sensors deployed in the
parking area. Moreover, the RSUC can instruct sensors on how to accomplish channel hopping in order
to mitigate heavy interference by providing a hopping schedule that the simple sensors can follow.
FWD (info_ch) FWD (info_ch) FWD (info_ch)
Data Messages (802.11p WSM)
Signaling Messages (OpenFlow)
Jamming 
Attacker
RSU
R
S
U
C
SET (blacklist_ch)
ANOMALY (jamming_detected)
Figure 5. Jamming attack on a smart parking.
As stated in Section 3.1, one of the main security concerns in smart parking is ensuring drivers’
privacy, considering that the SDN controller acquires information about vehicles’ positions to build
its global view of the network. A malicious vehicle can drive in the neighborhood of a parking area
and gather, store and analyze the beacons of vehicles currently parked or looking for a parking spot.
This attack is classically known as snooping (or eavesdropping) and aims to build information about
the victim(s) from the sampled data. In particular, the attack can be directed to a specific victim, trying
to reconstruct its habits or its driving path by analyzing its beacons, or it can be directed to the entire
driver community, studying large-scale patterns to predict its behavior. The key to solving this problem
is decoupling the ID from the vehicle, which can be achieved by using a pseudonym system [46] that
assigns the user a temporary ID and switches it under certain conditions. The conditions required by
this strategy are perfectly suited to a parking area: the ID can be randomly switched among a set of
cars that wait in a small geographical area for some time. In this way, it is impossible to keep track of
all the movements of a vehicle, eliminating the risk of single-targeted attacks.
For example, Figure 6 presents a typical smart parking scenario in which an eavesdropping
attack is being performed, and how the SDN controller counteracts. The vehicles Vn and Vm broadcast
beacons with a certain frequency, which will be received by the RSU but also eavesdropped by the
attacker. The intelligence in the RSU creates a list of the IDs in the area and sends it to the RSUC, which,
according to its policies, can trigger an ID switch for a subset of vehicles. In the example, Vn and Vm
exchange their IDs and, when they rebroadcast their beacons with the new ID, the attacker is unable to
associate past and current information to the same entity anymore.
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Figure 6. Eavesdropping/snooping attack in a smart parking area.
5.2. Smart Grid for Electric Vehicles
In the EVI, vehicles (mobile nodes) and the Smart Grid (fixed network) are frequently in contact,
exchanging data and energy through specific interfaces that are particularly vulnerable to attackers.
The safety of Vehicle to Grid (V2G) communications has been already studied in the literature [16].
However, some problems still need further investigation and more are likely to emerge given the huge
penetration of EVs in the near future. By applying the SDN approach, the SDN controller can, with the
support of monitoring and security applications, detect, isolate and mitigate attacks as soon as they
appear in the network. One of the most common form of attack which can take place in the EVI
is Software Malware. In fact, an EV could intentionally (or not) carry any sort of malicious software,
which first infects the EVSE it is connected to, from there it may potentially spread the worm to other
EVs or even worse, to the entire smart grid. The key to protecting the EVI from this type of attack is
to strengthen the security of access points to the fixed infrastructure (EVSEs), at both protocol and
physical level. Notably, the IEC 61851 protocol [33], which provides the specification for the physical
layer signaling, can be prone to attacks that modify the normal sequence of handshaking signals before
starting charging, and this can result in moderate to severe safety issues. In particular, malware
affecting the physical layer can notify the EVSE about the support for a fast charge option on a vehicle
that does not have it, leading the EVSE to provide the vehicle with an electrical power level that will not
be tolerated by the internal charging component of its On Board Unit (OBU). The consequences of this
malware attack can vary from shortening of battery life to battery explosion or vehicle fire. To mitigate
this issue at the infrastructure level, SDN can help by detecting EVSEs that are acting suspiciously, for
example supplying an incorrect amount of power for a certain type of vehicle or applying incorrect
billing policies. Once detected, these suspicious EVSEs are isolated from the network until they are
restored to a benign working state. Mitigating this type of attack can also be done at the network layer,
as already thoroughly investigated in traditional wired OpenFlow based systems, using data flow
analysis or exploiting other network features to infer suspicious vehicle behaviors.
EVs can also be subjected to Masquerade Attacks (i.e., identity theft), which impair the reliability
of the whole system. The dynamic of the attack is illustrated in Figure 7. At time T0, a certain EV
demands to be charged by EVSE_1. Before commencing energy supply, the station informs the
controller about the incoming flow through the message Packet_IN(EV, T0), which contains some
information such as the vehicle identity. Collected flow information is processed by the applications
connected to the controller through its NBI, helping the controller by providing information such as the
list of the closest and available EVSEs, according to the spatial distance and the features of the vehicle
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battery, etc. As highlighted by the dotted area defined in the right part of Figure 7 (Data Plane T1) ,
a vehicle that generally moves in a restricted area, is suddenly detected to be charging far away from
the expected EVSE. According to the spatial locality principle, this vehicle is considered compromised
and can be tagged as suspicious. In this situation the EV is possibly a victim of identity theft, and the
controller should perform further inspections, for instance the user for identity confirmation or directly
isolating the vehicle from the network. This is discovered by contacting the Data Plane at T1, where
the same EV appears at the station EVSE_k, which does not belong to the list of the EVSEs in the
neighborhood of EVSE_1, provided to the EV at time T0 by the Controller. With the PKT_Isolate
command, the flow is promptly blocked and the EV cannot access the grid until further checks are
carried out.
Controller
MonitoringCharging	Schedule
Identity
Manager
T0 T1
EVSE_1
Next	
EVSE	
EV	Location
History
Statistics/	Topology
EVSE_k
Signaling Messages	(OpenFlow)
Electrical	Power	Network
Time
Data	Plane	(T1)Data	Plane	(T0)
EVSE_1
Figure 7. Masquerade attack on EVI.
5.3. Platooning
Given the important role played by the platoon leader, one of the primary tasks of the central
controller (RSUC) should be the careful selection of the trusted leader. To this end, Hu et al. [47]
propose a recommendation scheme for follower vehicles to assist them in choosing the trusted leader.
Basically, a server ranks the platoon leader candidates by establishing a trust and reputation system.
The suitable candidates for the leader position are assessed after the server has collected feedback or
reputation scores from following vehicles. To ensure that no malicious vehicle compromises the ranking
procedure by injecting untruthful feedback, a filtering algorithm is used to exclude their feedback.
Besides privacy issues, several security attacks can be initiated in a CACC-enabled platoon, either
by external (i.e., vehicles external to the platoon) or internal attackers (vehicles belonging to the platoon
itself). Beacons messages normally used for intra-platoon communication, between the leader and
the followers, are vulnerable to such malicious or misbehaving attackers. In the following section we
describe how SDN could offer mechanisms for detecting and thwarting attacks from such malicious
users. The analysis is conducted in the two distinct modes of platoon operation: the normal traveling
and the platoon management maneuvers.
5.3.1. Normal Traveling Mode
In this mode, the platoon is a stream of vehicles traveling on a straight highway. The platoon
leader PIj (where I denotes the Platoon id and j denotes the id of the vehicle inside the platoon)
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will trigger a slowing down action or a speeding up action to increase or decrease respectively the
intra-platoon distance. To do this, the platoon leader relies on beaconing to exchange crucial parameters
for a longitudinal control [48]. Position and acceleration are the most critical parameters in maintaining
a safe gap between the stream of vehicles. An attacker can compromise safety by operating replay
attacks and jamming attacks on beacons.
• Replay attack:
The malicious user captures and replays a previously generated beacon at a later time or in other
parts of the platoon. The replayed beacon includes expired information not relevant to the current
situation of the platoon. For example, the platoon leader PA1 triggers an acceleration phase and
sends a beacon to other followers to make them catch up. The adversary user periodically injects
an old beacon with the old acceleration. Vehicles such as PA3 assume that the leader is driving
at the normal speed and do not accelerate, potentially resulting to platoon splitting. In order to
prevent replay attacks on platoons, the SDN paradigm can suggest two options. The first is to
use a globally synchronized time for all vehicles. The central controller is a suitable candidate for
providing a time reference making it pointless to inject old beacons into the platoon. The second
option is based on the use of nonce numbers to uniquely identify each communication, preventing
the malicious node from impersonating future communications inside the platoon. As shown
in Figure 8a, these nonce values are generated by the RSUC and communicated to the trusted
platoon leader via signaling messages (via the set_nonce_list command).
• Jamming attack:
The attacker can be either a stationary or a moving jammer. Given the nature of the mobility of
the platoon, it is rational to have a moving jammer that tracks the considered platoon and causes
regular interference. The high level of interference coupled with the continuous aspect of this
attacks makes it a thorny problem. As depicted in Figure 8b, the platoon leader PA1 broadcasts a
beacon on the control channel (CCH), defined by the IEEE 802.11p standard, to instruct vehicles to
slow down. PA2 re-broadcasts the beacon to the next follower vehicle. The malicious user jams the
same channel and disrupts the correct reception of the beacon by PA3 and the remaining vehicles.
Subsequently, vehicles inside the platoon will keep the same acceleration and hence can cause
fatal collisions. SDN can mitigate the adverse consequences of jamming by dynamically selecting
the channels on which beacons are sent: the central controller will provide the trusted leader with
a channel blacklist that identifies channels the controller regards as “bad” (set_blacklist_channels
command). This list is updated regularly, based on the general overview of the controller.
Channels are removed from the blacklist if the badness metric is below a specific threshold.
To realize this mode of operation, the RSUC can use the WSA message to announce to leaders
the suitable communications channels to use for their further communications with followers.
Then, to enable its follower vehicles to learn the blacklisted channels, the leader represents it
as a bitmap and embeds it in its beacons. Beacons are then forwarded in the data plane using
multi-hop communications. Thus, vehicles are able to re-broadcast beacons avoiding using
channels experiencing jamming.
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Figure 8. Different attacks on a platoon. (a) Replay Attack; (b) JammingAttack; (c) Insider Attack;
(d) DoS Attack.
5.3.2. Platoon Management Mode
During its journey, the platoon structure can undergo changes leading to it is becoming
bigger or smaller stream of vehicles. The platoon management protocols handle three basic
maneuvers: merge, split and lane change. Each maneuver is coordinated by exchanging a sequence
of micro-commands [49]. In this section we analyze the possible attacks that can frustrate the correct
operation of these maneuvers.
The platoon management protocol is based on a coordination approach. The leader initiates the
desired maneuver and followers either obey or send requests to the leader. to him. In addition, the
configuration data required for coordination (platoon depth, platoon size, platoon members, etc.) is
stored by the leader and not divulged to followers. The latter dynamically join and leave the platoon.
However, some attacks can affect the smoothness of these maneuvers. We highlight how an inside
attacker can impede two main maneuvers (merge and splitting).
• Merge maneuver:
Merge combines two successive platoons in the same lane to form one single platoon. As shown
in Figure 8c, this maneuver is initiated by the the platoon leader of the rear platoon (PB1 ) when the
platoon size is less than the predefined target platoon size. One way that PB1 , the compromised
vehicle, can frustrate this by extracting the platoon id of the leading platoon (via exchanged
beacons) and sending a unicast MERGE_REQ to PA1 , which is busy with another maneuver
and replies with a unicast MERGE_DELAY message to delay the merging operation. However,
instead of waiting for a specific time, the malicious attacker PB1 catches up with the front platoon
and sends CHANGE_PL to all its followers to set PA1 as a leader. Consequently, the resulting
platoon could exceed the predefined target size and followers of PB1 could obey to instructions not
intended for them. PB1 is considered to be as a trusted insider vehicle that has been compromised
by malicious software, complicating its detection. A novel SDN-based detection scheme can
integrate both data-centric and behavioral mechanisms. The network can be used as a point of
observation, which gives the central controller a holistic view of network activity. For instance, the
central controller can use data-centric mechanisms to detect that the insider vehicle is transmitting
incorrect data. Results are then reinforced using behavioral mechanisms, which check whether
this insider node is behaving according to protocol management specifications. In the example
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in Figure 8c, a correctly-behaving PB1 should trigger another MERGE_REQ after receiving
MERGE_DELAY from PA1 .
• Splitting maneuver:
A split maneuver divides a platoon into two successive ones in the same lane when, for example,
platoon size exceeds the predefined maximum size. It can be initiated by a follower in order
to become a free vehicle, or by a leader to make a space for a lane change. In Figure 8, the
leader PA1 initiates the splitting maneuver by sending a unicast request SPLIT_REQ to P
A
3 . Upon
reception of a SPLIT_ACCEPT from PA3 , P
A
1 sends a multicast message CHANGE_PL with its
forwarding rules to its followers behind PA3 to announce the leader change. At this moment, a
malicious user can mount a DoS by flooding the network with useless traffic to the vehicles that
should receive the CHANGE_PL, so generating forwarding disruption in the data plane. A large
amount of forged or faked traffic sent to vehicles implies that a large number of flow rules must be
stored exhausting the TCAM (ternary content-addressable memory) in forwarding vehicles and
preventing the installation of the rule for CHANGE_PL. Consequently, the instruction to change
platoon leader is not received by follower vehicles. Meanwhile, PA1 reports split completion by
sending SPLIT_DONE to PA3 so it can slow down. However, vehicles behind P
A
3 are not aware of
the leader change and cannot follow the false leader instructions. In SDN-enbaled VANETs, a DoS
attack can be mitigated by adjusting flow timeouts, making flow tables less prone to overflows.
This adjustment is made by the trusted platoon leader based on information communicated by the
Figure ( f low_timeout_table) in Figure 8d). Another way of avoiding bogus flows is to establish
access control lists. The SDN controller monitors all communication (beacons, WSA messages,
etc.) and builds a comprehensive view of the network. The analysis of different messages allows
the extraction of topological and forwarding information to build a holistic network graph with
traffic flows. Incoming traffic is compared to a set of validated flow rules [43].
As highlighted in this section, SDN promises to dramatically simplify platoon management
maneuvers and enable sophisticated countermeasures to overcome malicious users’ threats.
5.4. Emergency Services
Emergency services are also heavily impacted by the introduction of the SDN paradigm in
VANETs. Emergency notification is a life-critical VANET service that has particularly demanding
criteria for security, which SDN can strengthen. In an emergency, SDN can modify the amount of
network resources allocated for that VANET portion and reroute the emergency flow towards the
rescue service in an efficient and secure manner, coordinating data encryption and making sure that
messages are delivered correctly. An attacker who compromises the SDN-enabled VANET, can reroute
emergency requests preventing them from reaching needed rescue teams or alerting teams when they
are not required so impairing the reliability and availability of the service.
In traditional, distributed VANETs, a malicious vehicle can instruct a subset of nearby vehicles to
send all their traffic through the attacker’s interface. SDN can provide an efficient strategy against
this kind of attack, known in the literature as a Sink Hole attack. When a vehicle must act as a V2V
intermediate node for communication, either towards infrastructure or another vehicle in the area,
a trust-based authorization scheme, coordinated by the SDN controller, can be devised. In particular,
the intermediate node must ask the SDN controller for authorization to act as a data relay, after the
controller has computed its reputation in the opinion of the community. A generic vehicle that needs
to send data to another peer must ask the SDN controller whether the recipient is dependable or
not; this is determined by collecting feedback about it from the experience of community members.
For example, a positive feedback can be provided from the members of the community when a certain
vehicle forwards the traffic according to the rules of the protocol, while a negative feedback can be
provided when the vehicle acts like a sink hole, gaining the right to act as a intermediate forwarding
node but actually behaving like a Man-in-the-Middle. All the traffic, including emergency alerts will be
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routed through the malicious vehicle that, having full control of the information exchange, can decide
to drop all the requests for help coming from an area, as shown in Figure 9.
RSU
Malicious
Sink Hole
Vehicle
R
S
U
C
Rescue Team
AZnc
AZncAZc
Figure 9. Example of sink hole attack on Emergency Services. The attacker receives and drops all the
emergency requests from the vehicles in a certain area and this prevents the normal procedures of
emergency forwarding and requests for special network resources. The red crosses over the faded
arrows indicate the messages that would be exchanged in a regular scenario but, because of the attack,
are not. The solution is to rely on SDN technology to elect only reputable intermediate nodes for
V2V communication.
If a malicious user takes control of a subset of vehicles that have been infected by malware
(zombie vehicles), a particular case of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) applied to VANETs can occur.
When the coordinating malicious vehicle (botmaster) triggers its infected vehicles subset (botnet),
each infected node can start to originate fake emergency requests to overload the rescue team, thereby
compromising the availability of the road safety service. In this case, SDN can identify the sources of
the malicious traffic and then instruct the data plane (RSUs and vehicles) to drop the packets of those
flows. In this way, the malicious network traffic is dropped directly at the routing device closest to the
zombie vehicle. Furthermore, an SDN-based reputation management scheme for vehicles could be
useful in identifying malicious users and exclude them from the network, using a shared consensus
algorithm that is resilient to malicious collectives and does not present single points of failure [50].
Similarly, a malicious vehicle could notify a fake accident at a certain geographical location,
so that the SDN controller reroutes the all other vehicles along a different path, allowing the malicious
vehicle to benefit from a totally empty road. This is a typical example of a bogus information attack,
and the SDN paradigm can effectively neutralize this threat using a collective consensus approach.
After a vehicle signals an emergency in a certain area, the SDN controller collects related information
from the other vehicles driving in that area. If the information collected from the other vehicles is
inconsistent with that provided by the presumed malicious vehicle, the SDN controller sends a rule to
its RSU to drop all the packets of that vehicles’ flows.
6. Conclusions
Connected vehicles in a smart city are evolving in a highly dynamic and complex environment
that shapes driver decisions in critical situations. Specifically, Vehicular Ad hoc NETworks (VANETs)
are widely accepted as a cornerstone for enabling safety, traffic and infotainment applications for
drivers, passengers, and pedestrians in the smart city. Indeed, these highly-mobile networks are
expected to contribute to road safety by providing pertinent information to drivers on potential
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threats within their surroundings. However, a VANET is not a benign environment, owing to its vast
operating area and the underlying technologies used to deliver critical information. The wireless
transmission of data using V2I and V2V communications makes it easily and constantly accessible
to malicious users. Undoubtedly, in smart cities, security is fundamental to ensure a high level of
availability and the integrity of services vital to citizens. While the complexity of smart cities is
steadily increasing and evolving, traditional security measures and network management tools cannot
practically cope with the explosively growing number of vehicles and the plethora of forwarding
rules updates. To counter this thorny issue, Software Defined Networking (SDN) is proposed as an
efficient paradigm that offers agility and flexibility to deal with the surge of vehicles and accommodate
heterogeneous running applications. The first part of our paper provided an overview of SDN and
the underlying architectures in VANETs, giving a special attention to new emerging applications in
VANETs such as smart parking, platooning and electric vehicles. Our purpose was to investigate how
these new applications can be orchestrated and managed by SDN. However, the new way of operating
communication networks within SDN poses security and privacy challenges that must be solved so
smart cities can be successful and accepted by citizens. To this end, we provided a comprehensive
review of threat vectors in both VANETs and SDNs. For instance, platoon leader, electric vehicles and
electric vehicle infrastructure could be the target of malicious users intent on wrecking vital services in
a smart city. This investigation was particularly useful in understanding how SDN can overcome the
weaknesses and vulnerabilities of current VANET architectures. Starting from this point, we provided
some insights into the primary improvements required by SDN in the targeted use cases of VANETs.
The intelligence of the SDN controller can detect improper behavior of electric vehicles or platoon
members. Consequently, it can isolate these malicious nodes and reduce the resources allocated to
them. Furthermore, the programmability of SDN allows security policies to be upgraded as the smart
city evolves.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first study that tackles the issues and new
countermeasures introduced by SDN in SDN-enabled VANETs. However, there is a long path ahead of
us before we can ensure a benign VANET environment where drivers and passengers can make their
journeys without being compromised. We urge governments, standardization bodies and research
institutions, along with car manufacturers to plan at all levels for making SDN a future security
solution in our smart cities.
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